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THE EFFECT OF MCNEIL v. NFL ON
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION IN THE NFL




In 1990, the standout quarterback for the New Orleans Saints, Bobby
Hebert, was unable to come to terms for a new contract with his team.
Despite the fact that Hebert previously led the Saints to their first winning
season and first playoff appearance in franchise history, the Saints were un-
willing to pay Hebert anything close to what he believed he deserved.
Although a "free agent" because his prior contract with the Saints had ex-
pired, like virtually all other NFL "free agents" for more than a decade, he
attracted no offers from any other club during the two-month period that
such offers could have been extended. As time went by and no progress on
a new contract was made, Hebert asked the Saints to trade him to a club
that would offer him pay more commensurate with his worth. Despite a
significant offer from the Los Angeles Raiders to trade for Hebert, the
Saints refused to trade him to the Raiders or anyone else. The Saints also
became more aggressive in their dealings with Hebert, vilifying him in the
media, insulting his wife, and making a "take it or leave it" offer presenting
Hebert with a Hobson's choice: Either take a totally unacceptable offer or
sit out the season and not be paid. As a matter of principle, he chose the
latter. Even though Hebert had no contract with the New Orleans Saints
and even though he sat out the entire 1990 season, in 1991 he remained the
property of the Saints, unable to negotiate with any other professional foot-
ball club in the NFL. 1
In 1992, All-Pro tight end Keith Jackson of the Philadelphia Eagles
found himself in the same situation that Hebert was in two years earlier.
Jackson was a free agent unable to come to terms for a new contract with
* Carol T. Rieger is a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Lindquist & Vennum and one of
the trial lawyers for the players in the recent case of McNeil v. NFL. She and her firm have
represented players in a number of cases relating to free agency.
** Charles J. Lloyd is a partner in the law firm of Lindquist & Vennum who has represented
the players in a number of recent cases relating to free agency.
1. The above summary is taken from the summary of Bobby Hebert's testimony in McNeil v.
National Football League. See Transcript of Record at 3648-3763, McNeil v. National Football
League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992) (No. 4-90-476).
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the Eagles and unable to obtain offers from any competing clubs. As time
passed, the Eagles became more aggressive in their negotiations with Jack-
son. Jackson missed all of training camp and the first weeks of the season
with no indication that he could reach a contract with the Eagles, failing his
capitulation to the Eagles' terms.2 However, unlike Hebert, Jackson ulti-
mately obtained his freedom and signed a lucrative contract with the Miami
Dolphins. This article discusses the reasons for the different outcomes and
the prospects for future NFL free agents.
One pivotal event separates the endings of Hebert's and Jackson's sto-
ries. On September 10, 1992, a jury in Minneapolis, Minnesota, rendered
its verdict in McNeil v. National Football League.' After hearing testimony
since mid-June, the jury concluded that the restrictions on free agent move-
ment in the NFL were unreasonably restrictive and a violation of the anti-
trust laws. Within days of that verdict, several players - including
Jackson - sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction to prevent the NFL from enforcing their restrictions against the
players who sought the relief.4 The court granted the TRO and for five
days Jackson and the others were given the opportunity to solicit offers
from any NFL club without restriction. Thus, instead of sitting out the
entire season as the exclusive property of one team, as Hebert had to do,
Jackson signed a new contract with the Dolphins and, in doing so, signaled
that the jury in McNeil had ushered in a new era in the National Football
League.
II. MOVING FROM THEN TO Now - THE COURSE OF FREE AGENCY
LITIGATION
A. Mackey v. NFL and the Demise of the Rozelle Rule
Since the 1970s, Minneapolis has been the center of a long course of
litigation challenging restrictions on free agency imposed by the National
Football League. The seminal case concerning football free agency before
this latest string of decisions was Mackey v. National Football League,5 the
lawsuit that successfully challenged the then-existing restraints on player
2. This summary is taken from the complaint and the declaration of Keith Jackson in Jack-
son v. National Football League. Transcript of the Record, Jackson v. National Football League,
802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992) (No. 4-92-876).
3. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
4. Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992).
5. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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movement known as the "Rozelle Rule."6 After fifty-six days of trial,
Judge Earl Larson found that the restrictions contained in the Rozelle Rule
were not immunized from antitrust scrutiny by operation of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption and were both aper se violation and a violation of the
Rule of Reason under the antitrust laws.7 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Larson's labor ex-
emption and Rule of Reason analysis, although it rejected the per se find-
ing.8 The result was a monumental victory for the players and a
monumental decision in sports law.
The NFL and its member clubs subsequently sought review by the
United States Supreme Court, but withdrew their petition when the parties
reached a collective bargaining agreement and settled the litigation in
1977. 9 Although the Rozelle Rule was dead, the 1977 collective bargaining
agreement contained a new set of restrictions on player movement - the
Right of First Refusal/Compensation system ("RFR/C system"). The
RFR/C system was designed to address what at the time were viewed as the
primary evils associated with the Rozelle Rule - namely, the contract op-
tion provision and the unknown compensation. Under the RFR/C system,
veteran players could negotiate to eliminate the option clause from the
player contract. If the option clause was included in a player contract,
there was to be at least a 10% increase in salary over the previous year.
Compensation was specifically defined in the collective bargaining agree-
ment based on a grid comprised of a horizontal line representing years of
experience in the league, a vertical line representing salary levels, and sev-
eral diagonal lines establishing draft choice compensation. In theory, the
provisions of the 1977 collective bargaining agreement eliminated the fear
associated with the unknown compensation component of the old Rozelle
Rule. However, nothing changed in terms of free agent movement.
6. Two components of the Rozelle Rule substantially hindered a player's ability to change
clubs. First, in order to become a free agent under the Rozelle Rule, a player had to play out his
option - the final year of his contract - at a 10% decrease in salary from the previous year. If a
player was willing to make the financial sacrifice and play out the option, making him available to
receive offers from other clubs, his former club was entitled to compensation from the new club
for the loss of his services. If the two clubs were unable to agree on the appropriate compensation,
the NFL Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, would unilaterally determine the compensation. There
were no guidelines to restrict his decision. With few players willing to play out their option and
even fewer clubs willing to take their chances with the unknown compensation, there was virtually
no movement under the Rozelle Rule. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1004-06.
7. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. 1000.
8. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
9. National Football League v. Mackey, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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In addition to the reforms of the option clause and the compensation
scheme, the 1977 collective bargaining agreement provided clubs with a
right of first refusal in the event a veteran free agent player received an offer
from another club. If the player's former club made a qualifying offer as
defined by the collective bargaining agreement, that club would retain a
right of first refusal to match any other club's offer or it would receive draft
choice compensation pursuant to the grid if the club chose not to exercise
the right of first refusal. These same provisions (with certain modifications
to the compensation grid) were also contained in the 1982 collective bar-
gaining agreement between the clubs and the players' union.
Although the reforms were meant to address perceived problems with
the Rozelle Rule, the effect of the restrictions on player movement was the
same. For the ten-year period from 1977 to 1987, when the collective bar-
gaining agreement expired, only one player changed clubs out of the
thousands of free agents who were subject to the draft choice
compensation. 10
B. The Litigation Continues - Powell v. NFL
1. The Beginning of the End of the RFR/C System
When negotiations began for a successor agreement to the 1982 collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the players were determined to eliminate the
RFR/C system contained in the 1977 and 1982 collective bargaining agree-
ments to ensure that players, at some point in their careers, would have the
opportunity to be true free agents. After lengthy negotiations between the
union and the clubs and after an unsuccessful strike by the players, several
players filed the case of Powell v. NFL, challenging the legality of the RFR/
C system in Federal Court in Minneapolis.11
In their answer to the Powell complaint, the NFL and its member clubs
asserted a defense that the RFR/C system was exempt from the antitrust
laws by operation of the non-statutory labor exemption. Within several
weeks of the commencement of the action, both sides moved for summary
judgment on the labor exemption issue and the plaintiffs sought a prelimi-
10. In 1977, Norm Thompson moved from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Baltimore Colts.
Tom Friend, Marshall Given "Good Change" of Redskins by Agent, WASH. PosT, Mar. 13, 1988,
at D3. Although Wilber Marshall was portrayed as having moved as a free agent in 1988 after the
collective bargaining agreement expired, the NFL's documents demonstrate that he was actually
traded by the Chicago Bears to the Washington Redskins. Thus, no additional players subject to
the RFR/C system moved between 1977 and the end of the McNeil trial. Appellees Appendix T
at 399-401, Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-5901).
11. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1987), superceded by
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 711 (1991).
[Vol. 3:45
McNEIL v NFL
nary injunction to halt the enforcement of the RFR/C system pending reso-
lution of the case on the merits.
Following argument on the labor exemption issue in late December
1987, Judge David Doty of the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota entered an order that created the framework for deciding the
labor exemption issue. 12 Judge Doty determined that the labor exemption
survived the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement but declined
the NFL's request to extend the exemption in perpetuity if the restrictions
had at one time been embodied in a collective bargaining agreement.13 In-
stead, Judge Doty determined that once the parties reached a bargaining
impasse, thereby permitting the League to unilaterally change the terms
and conditions of employment, there was no longer any purpose served by
continuing the non-statutory labor exemption." Because Judge Doty said
he was unable to determine whether the parties had in fact reached a bar-
gaining impasse, he declined to rule on the motion at that time."5
The existence of an impasse was also being considered simultaneously in
another forum. On September 16, 1987, the NFL had filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board against the Na-
tional Football League Players Association (NFLPA), the then-existing
players' union, alleging that the NFLPA had refused to bargain in good
faith over the terms and conditions of employment as required by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.16 Among other things, the NFLPA alleged in
defense of the unfair labor practice charge that it was not required to con-
tinue to meet and bargain with the NFL because the parties had reached
impasse in negotiations. Upon investigation of the NFL's charge, the Asso-
ciate General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board's Division of
Advice declined to issue a complaint against the NFLPA, concluding that
the parties had in fact reached a bargaining impasse prior to the NFLPA's
refusal to meet and bargain over the terms and conditions of employment.17
After the NLRB's dismissal of the NFL's unfair labor practice charge,
the players renewed their motion on the labor exemption issue. Judge Doty
granted the players' motion for summary judgment on the labor exemption
issue concluding that the parties had in fact reached impasse and, therefore,
the non-statutory labor exemption would not insulate the RFR/C system
12. Id.
13. Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 815 (D. Minn. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 818.
16. In re National Football League, NLRB Case No. 2-CB-12117 (Apr. 28, 1988), cited in
Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559, 569 (8th Cir. 1989).
17. Id.
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from antitrust review.18 Despite finding that the players were suffering ir-
reparable harm because of the operation of the RFR/C system and that
they were likely to succeed on the merits of their antitrust challenge, Judge
Doty refused to grant the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
because, in his view, the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited injunctions with
respect to union management disputes. 9 Finally, Judge Doty certified his
labor exemption ruling for immediate interlocutory review by the Eighth
Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).2 0
2. The Birth of Plan B
In November 1988, after the court's impasse determination, the NFL
presented to the NFLPA what it termed alternative bargaining proposals.
"Plan A" called for the continuation of the RFR/C system with respect to
free agency and provided for some minimal enhancements to non-salary
benefits under the collective bargaining agreement. In the alternative,
"Plan B" slashed benefits to players but gave free agency to a limited
number of players on each team's roster. Under Plan B as proposed, each
club was permitted to restrict forty, forty-two, or forty-four players, de-
pending on the club's final standings (the best clubs could protect the fewest
players). Those players who were unrestricted, whether or not they had a
contract in place, would be allowed to negotiate with any team other than
their current one for a two-month period without being subject either to a
right of first refusal or the compensation system. However, restricted play-
ers, even if their contracts had expired, continued to be subject to the RFR/
C system.
Although touted by the NFL as a new beginning to bargaining, both
proposals had previously been rejected by the NFLPA.2" Not surprisingly,
the NFLPA once again rejected both proposals. Shortly after Judge Doty's
decision indicating that the players were likely to succeed on the merits of
their challenge to the then-existing RFR/C system, the NFL informed the
Players Association of its intent to unilaterally implement Plan B, effective
February 1, 1989.
The players immediately went to court seeking to preliminarily enjoin
the imposition of Plan B on the ground that, as proposed, its changes were
purely cosmetic and would limit "free agency" to only those players whom
18. Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 814-18.
21. Affidavit of Richard A. Berthelsen, Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559
(8th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-5041).
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the clubs would normally release from year to year. Moreover, the players
were losing their benefits so that there was no quid pro quo for the imposi-
tion of the RFR/C system. Within days after the hearing on plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, the NFL announced that it was modifying
Plan B so that thirty-seven players per club, irrespective of the club's prior
finish, would be protected, instead of the forty to forty-four players in-
cluded in the original plan. This change resulted in freedom for an addi-
tional 142 players. 22
The imposition of Plan B which resulted from the Powell litigation was
significant in two fundamental respects. First, for those players who were
left unrestricted, it meant free agency and the ability to have their salaries
determined by competition and market forces.23 As shown during the exist-
ence of competing leagues and during the operation of Plan B, competition
causes unrestricted players' salaries to go up. Second, Plan B demonstrated
that the RFR/C system not only restricted players' abilities to move to
other teams, but it also showed that the system significantly held down sala-
ries for those players subject to the system. Important evidence was intro-
duced in the McNeil trial showing the effects of free agency under Plan B, a
system adopted because of the Powell litigation.
3. The Players' Decision to Abandon Union Status
On November 1, 1989, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
Judge Doty with respect to the termination of the non-statutory labor ex-
emption.24 In a two to one decision, the Eighth Circuit determined that
impasse was not an appropriate end point for the labor exemption because
of its effect on collective bargaining. Instead, the court indicated that so
long as there was a collective bargaining relationship, the exemption pro-
tected an employer from antitrust scrutiny. Although noting the exemption
would at some point terminate, the court specifically declined to establish
22. This change is significant in terms of the number of players who have moved under Plan
B: 229 in 1989; 184 in 1990; 139 in 1991; and 169 in 1992. Thomas George, N.F.L. Veterans Jump
at Plan B, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at B10.
23. Plan B did not provide complete free agency to unrestricted players because those players
were unable to negotiate with their own teams during their short window of free agency. Fre-
quently, a player's own team had the best knowledge of his skills and often a player wished to
remain with his old team for a variety of reasons, so this limitation was significant.
24. Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559, superceded by 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 711 (1991).
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an end point for the labor exemption, but it concluded that the parties had
not reached that point.25
In the wake of the Eighth Circuit's opinion and the court's refusal to
reconsider the opinion en banc,26 the Powell plaintiffs petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari review of the Eighth Circuit decision.
In support of the players' position, the Attorneys General of nine states
filed an amicus brief noting the adverse effect that the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion would have on state antitrust laws. The Supreme Court initially de-
ferred the decision on the players' certiorari petition, inviting the Justice
Department to file a brief outlining the government's position on the non-
statutory labor exemption in the opinion issued by the Eighth Circuit.27 In
December 1990, the Solicitor General filed a brief with the Supreme Court,
indicating the government's position that the Eighth Circuit's opinion was
contrary to law and should be reversed.2 Notwithstanding the briefs filed
by the state attorneys general and the Justice Department, the Supreme
Court voted seven to two to deny the players' certiorari petition.29
In the aftermath of the Eighth Circuit's Powell decision, the players
were faced with a dilemma. They could continue to bargain collectively
with the NFL with the hope of reaching a satisfactory agreement, but by
doing so they would continue to insulate the NFL from the operation of the
antitrust laws. In the alternative, they could abandon their union status
and forego their right to collectively bargain with the NFL.
After weighing the benefits and the disadvantages of both courses of
action, the players determined that it would be in their best interest to cease
collective bargaining and no longer function as a union. The players' union,
the NFLPA, immediately disclaimed interest in representing NFL football
players in collective bargaining. At team meetings, more than 930 of the
1,500 players signed petitions stating that they did not want the NFLPA or
anyone else to represent them in collective bargaining.30 As a consequence,
25. A strong dissent was registered by Judge Gerald Heaney, who stated that the majority
opinion may leave, as the only option, abandonment of union status to obtain protection of the
antitrust laws. See Powell, 888 F.2d at 570 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
26. The refusal to reconsider provoked another strong dissent, this time from Chief Judge
Donald Lay, who said that the panel majority had "impliedly overruled this court's longstanding,
well-recognized precedent" in Mackey. Id. at 572 (Lay, J., dissenting). Judge Lay went on to
write, "this court's unprecedented decision leads to the ineluctable result of union decertification
in order to invoke rights to which players are clearly entitled under the antitrust laws." Id. at 573
(Lay, J., dissenting).
27. Powell v. National Football League, 496 U.S. 903 (1990).
28. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, Powell v. National Football League, 496 U.S.
903 (1990) (No. 89-1421).
29. Powell v. National Football League, 111 S.Ct. 711 (1991).
30. McNeil v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 n.1 (D. Minn. 1991).
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the NFLPA, among other things, ultimately changed its bylaws so that its
officials are now prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining, and the
NFLPA's tax status was changed from a labor union to a professional
association.3'
Taking those steps cleared the way for the players to again challenge the
RFR/C system, this time as embodied in Plan B. The Plan B restraints for
restricted players had virtually the same effect as the old RFR/C system,
and it operated in an inequitable fashion. First, restricted players subject to
the RFR/C system received virtually no offers. Since February 1, 1989,
only three players received offers from other clubs - and all three were
matched by the players' old clubs.32 Moreover, players lost a substantial
portion of their nonsalary benefits, which the league had earlier contended
was the quid pro quo for the RFR/C system. Thus, the vast majority of
players were being restricted from freely marketing their services and were
receiving nothing in return. Players who were left unprotected (i.e., those
players who were not among a club's thirty-seven restricted players), on the
other hand, were able to negotiate contracts in the free market, thus creat-
ing situations in which back-ups were being paid more than starters at the
same position. For example, offensive lineman Dave Richards, a starter
with the San Diego Chargers, was paid less than Mark May, whom the
Chargers signed through Plan B to serve as Richards' back-up. 33 Similarly,
many clubs refused to pay signing bonuses to veteran players, who were
forced to sign new contracts with their old clubs by operation of the RFR/
C system. Those same clubs, however, because of competition, paid signing
bonuses to free agents whom they signed under Plan B, creating yet another
situation in which back-ups were treated better than starters because of the
back-ups' ability to negotiate in a free market.
4. The Challenge to Plan B
In early April 1990, after the free agency signing period for the 1990
season had expired, a group of players led by New York Jets running back
Freeman McNeil filed suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey challenging the restrictions under Plan B as violations of
31. Id. at 1354.
32. Bruce Smith of the Buffalo Bills received an offer from the Denver Broncos, Ray Chil-
dress of the Houston Oilers received an offer from the Chicago Bears, and Pat Swilling of the New
Orleans Saints received an offer from the Detroit Lions. Thomas George, Lions Woo Swilling
With a Lofty Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at BI5.
33. Transcipt of the Record at 412, McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871
(D. Minn. 1992) (No. 4-90-476); Record at 3982-86, McNeil (No. 4-90-476); Plaintiff's Trial
Exhibit 804-A, McNeil (No. 4-90-476).
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the antitrust laws.3 4 In the first major ruling of the McNeil litigation, the
New Jersey Court granted the NFL's motion to transfer the case to Minne-
sota,35 thereby making Minnesota yet again the scene for determination of
the legality of player movement.
In McNeil, the NFL once again raised the labor exemption defense,
claiming that Plan B was the product of bona fide arms length bargaining.
Judge Doty, however, rejected that position, holding instead that, because
the NFLPA was no longer a labor union and thus there was no longer a
collective bargaining relationship, the non-statutory labor exemption had
expired.3 6 That ruling, which the Eighth Circuit declined to review on an
interlocutory basis, permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with the trial on the
merits concerning the RFR/C system.
III. McNEIL v NFL: FREE AGENCY ON TRIAL
The McNeil trial began on June 15, 1992, with jury selection. When the
dust of voir dire and peremptory strikes had settled, the jury that remained
was comprised of all women, most of whom disclosed that they were not
sports fans at all. The make-up of the jury prompted some interesting re-
sults. One reporter wrote about the stark contrast between the jurors and
NFL club owners, noting, for example, the way one of the jurors arrived at
the courthouse (at the back door on her bicycle) as compared to the arrival
of Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland Browns (who drove up to the front
door in a chauffeured limousine).3" At least one of the owners publicly ex-
pressed displeasure with the make-up of the jury. Pat Bowlen, the owner of
the Denver Broncos, stated that he did not want "eight women who are
basically domestic housewives [to] decide the future of the National Foot-
ball League."138 Reaction to Bowlen's comments was swift and strong. For
example, Cathy Henkel, president of the Association for Women in Sports
Media, was quoted as saying: "It appears to be quite archaic thinking and
the kind of thinking that got them where they are today. ' 39 Although his
name was on the NFL's witness list, Bowlen did not testify at the trial.
Inside the courtroom, all eight plaintiffs testified, and explained how
Plan B affected them both personally and financially. In addition, agents
34. McNeil v. National Football League, No. 90-1402 (D.N.J. 1990).
35. Id.
36. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. 871.
37. Bob Oates, They Have Hands That Might Rock the Cradle, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at
C3.
38. Bowlen Hopes NFL Skips Jury, ROCKY MouNT. NEWS, July 22, 1992, at B5.
39. Denise Tom, Bowlen's "Housewife" Remark Called "Ridiculous," "Archaic," USA TO-
DAY, July 24, 1992, at 2C.
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for the players testified about their experiences in attempting to negotiate
contracts under the RFR/C component of Plan B. In sharp contrast, not
one owner testified throughout the entire thirty-six days of testimony. That
is not to say that the owners did not come to Minneapolis. In fact, a
number of owners were in the court at any given time observing the pro-
ceedings. However, as the plaintiffs' attorney noted in his closing argu-
ment, "not one of them would make that, what is it, forty, fifty, sixty-foot
walk up to that witness stand." 4
One event, more than any other, drew a significant amount of media
attention during the trial. During the course of discovery in the Powell and
McNeil cases, plaintiffs pursued detailed financial records of the clubs and
league in order to probe the defendants' defense that free agency would
wreak financial havoc among the clubs. The league bitterly fought with the
players in an effort to avoid disclosing the financial data. In the end, how-
ever, they were required by court order to provide plaintiffs with the de-
tailed financial information.41 Much of the financial information was then
used by plaintiffs' expert economist, Dr. Roger Noll, to rebut the league's
economic calamity defense. Dr. Noll testified that the documents show that
the clubs are very profitable entities - more profitable than they claim,
because of money taken by owners in the form of salaries, through related
party transactions, and by other means. It was the first time that such de-
tailed information relating to the league's finances had been aired in public.
While the players contended that the RFR/C system component of
Plan B held salaries down, the league countered that everyone, owners and
players alike, had prospered under the system, and therefore the players
were not suffering any injury even if the RFR/C system was in fact overly
restrictive. The league's attorneys repeatedly cross-examined the plaintiffs
and their agents utilizing charts showing the amounts of money earned by
the players over the course of their careers, and the amounts of raises re-
ceived despite the restrictions on their ability to negotiate contracts in the
free market.
Finally, following a full day of closing arguments by the lawyers and
instructions from the court, the jury deliberated two days and ultimately
returned a verdict on September 10, 1992, finding that the RFR/C system
had a substantially harmful effect on competition for players services; that
40. Transcript of the Record at 8623, McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871
(D. Minn. 1992) (No. 4-90-476).
41. Even then, they failed to disclose all of the data ordered by the court. In the middle of the
trial, Magistrate Judge Floyd Boline found that the NFL defendants "bushwhacked" the plaintiffs
by failing to make full disclosure and ordered a $15,000 sanction against the NFL. See Order,
McNeil (No. 4-90-476).
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the system significantly contributed to competitive balance; that the system
was more restrictive than reasonably necessary; and that the plaintiffs had
suffered economic injury as a result of the imposition of the system.42 The
RFR/C system in Plan B was dead.
IV. AFTER MCNEIL: THE LITIGATION GOES ON
A. Jackson v. NFL
On the day the jury returned its verdict, at least ten veteran players
remained unsigned in the NFL and were thus not being paid as the season
progressed. Those ten players immediately filed suit, seeking to prevent the
continued imposition of the Plan B restrictions against them and seeking
damages for the injuries suffered for the imposition of the system.43 Ac-
companying their complaint was a motion for a temporary restraining order
that would permit the ten players to immediately gain free agency. Before
the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, six
of the ten plaintiffs were either unconditionally released, thereby making
them free agents, or were traded at their request to another club with which
they signed a contract, leaving only four plaintiffs unsigned and restricted.'
On September 24, 1992, Judge Doty issued an order temporarily re-
straining the NFL from enforcing the RFR/C system or any other system
for a period of five days.45 The court also ordered that, at the end of the five
days, there be a hearing on a preliminary injunction to extend the terms of
the temporary restraining order until the matter could be fully adjudicated
on the merits. Three of the four players, Keith Jackson, Garin Veris and
Webster Slaughter, signed contracts with other teams during this brief pe-
riod.46 The fourth, D.J. Dozier, was unconditionally released by the De-
troit Lions so he could negotiate with other teams. At the league's request,
Judge Doty canceled the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Still re-
maining in the Jackson case are the players' claims for damages resulting
42. Transcript of the Record at 3-5, McNeil (No. 4-90-476). The jury also awarded damages
to four plaintiffs: Mark Collins $178,000; Frank Minnifield $50,000; Dave Richards $240,000; and
Lee Rouson $75,000. These damages were tripled under antitrust laws.
43. Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992).
44. The original plaintiffs were Keith Jackson, D.J. Dozier, Thomas Everett, Louis Lipps,
Stephone Paige, Joseph Phillips, Webster Slaughter, Natu Tuatagaloa, Garin Veris and Leon
White. Before the plaintiffs' motion could be heard, Lipps, Paige, Phillips, Tuatagaloa and White
were given unconditional releases making them free agents. Lipps eventually signed with the New
Orleans Saints, White signed with the Los Angeles Rams, and Tuatagaloa signed with the Seattle
Seahawks. Everett was traded by Pittsburgh to Dallas and he signed with the Cowboys.
45. Jackson, 802 F. Supp. 226.
46. Jackson signed with the Miami Dolphins, Veris with the San Francisco 49ers, and
Slaughter with the Houston Oilers.
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from imposition of the Plan B restrictions against them prior to the time
they were given their freedom, either by release or by operation of the re-
straining order.
B. Other Pending Litigation
Although the McNeil jury verdict was a significant victory for the play-
ers in their fight to gain free agency, it was by no means the last step in the
process. The McNeil plaintiffs have scheduled a hearing on their motion for
a permanent injunction against enforcement of Plan B or any other system
the league may seek to impose against plaintiffs. Players argued that the
verdict against the NFL puts the onus on the league to come to court and
demonstrate that any new system would satisfy the antitrust laws, rather
than requiring the plaintiffs to repeatedly challenge each new system that
the league may seek to impose to replace Plan B.4 7
In addition, a class action was filed in Minnesota by Philadelphia Eagles
defensive end Reggie White and others seeking to enjoin the future enforce-
ment of Plan B or any other system, and seeking damages for the prior
imposition of Plan B as well as for the clubs' refusal to negotiate individual
benefit packages such as individual insurance coverage.48 The plaintiffs in
the White case scheduled a hearing on their request for a preliminary in-
junction to block the league from enforcing Plan B against any players for
the 1993 season.
V. THE EFFECTS OF FREE AGENCY LITIGATION ON NFL CONTRACTS
There can be little doubt that competition for player services has in-
creased and will continue to increase player salaries. In the two recent ex-
amples of competition - interleague competition between the NFL and the
United States Football League (USFL) and competition for unrestricted
players under Plan B within the NFL, the effects of competition have been
dramatic.
During the USFL years, when the NFL had competition, salaries
skyrocketed. The NFL had to pay substantially higher salaries to keep
players from signing with the rival league. During the Powell litigation,
NFL lawyers contended that it was the rapidly increasing salaries from the
USFL years that made the RFR/C system outmoded because most players
47. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950). See also Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1968).
48. White v. National Football League, No. 4-92-906 (D. Minn. 1992).
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began making salaries that would trigger high compensation.49 Further-
more, Michael Glassman, an economist from Washington, D.C., testified in
the McNeil trial that during 1984, when competition between the USFL
and the NFL was in full swing, the average salary increases were more than
twice the percentage received immediately prior to and immediately after
the USFL years.50 Similarly, Glassman testified about competition's effect
on unrestricted players' salaries under Plan B. By comparing the contracts
that the unrestricted players received from their new clubs with the con-
tracts they had with their old clubs, Glassman determined that those play-
ers received on average a nearly 42% higher salary.51
Additionally, the small dose of free agency resulting from the temporary
restraining order in Jackson confirms that salaries rise when there is compe-
tition for players' services.5 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Competition is obviously the best way to determine salaries, and it is
clearly the wave of the future. Although the course of litigation has been
long and difficult - and seemingly without end - the results are dramatic
and could not have been obtained without it. Free agency not only estab-
lishes salaries by the free market, but it also allows the players to negotiate
individual benefit packages such as insurance and severance. It opens up
the opportunity to receive guaranteed money through signing bonuses and
guaranteed contracts. It gives players freedom to choose where and for
whom they will play and where they will live. This freedom - taken for
granted by almost everyone - is long overdue for professional football
players in this country.***
49. Transcript of Record at 155, 171, 197, Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp.
812 (D. Minn. 1988) (No. 4-87-917).
50. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 417A, McNeil (4-90-476).
51. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 438B, McNeil (4-90-476).
52. Gordon Forbes, Slaughter Catches on Oilers, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1992, at 1C; Gordon
Forbes, Jackson Flips to Dolphins for $6 Million, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1992, at IC; Michael
Martinez, Veris (49ers) and Jackson (Dolphins) Hook On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at B9.
*** Editor's note: Since this article was written, a settlement has been reached in the cases
discussed above. Judge Doty granted preliminary approval of the settlement on February 26,
1993 and a final approval hearing is set for April 16, 1993.
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